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DOI 10.1186/s13063-017-2305-9RESEARCH Open Access‘We all want to succeed, but we’ve also got
to be realistic about what is happening’: an
ethnographic study of relationships in trial
oversight and their impact
Anne Daykin1*†, Lucy E. Selman1,2† , Helen Cramer1, Sharon McCann3, Gillian W. Shorter4,5, Matthew R. Sydes6,7,
Carrol Gamble8, Rhiannon Macefield1, J. Athene Lane1,2† and Alison Shaw1†Abstract
Background: The oversight and conduct of a randomised controlled trial involves several stakeholders, including a
Trial Steering Committee (TSC), Trial Management Group (TMG), Data Monitoring Committee (DMC), funder and
sponsor. We aimed to examine how the relationships between these stakeholders affect the trial oversight process
and its rigour, to inform future revision of Good Clinical Practice guidelines.
Methods: Using an ethnographic study design, we observed the oversight processes of eight trials and conducted
semi-structured interviews with members of the trials’ TSCs and TMGs, plus other relevant informants, including
sponsors and funders of trials. Data were analysed thematically, and findings triangulated and integrated to give a
multi-perspective account of current oversight practices in the UK.
Results: Eight TSC and six TMG meetings from eight trials were observed and audio-recorded, and 66 semi-structured
interviews conducted with 52 purposively sampled key informants. Five themes are presented: (1) Collaboration within
the TMG and role of the CTU; (2) Collaboration and conflict between oversight committees; (3) Priorities; (4)
Communication between trial oversight groups and (5) Power and accountability. There was evidence of
collaborative relationships, based on mutual respect, between CTUs, TMGs and TSCs, but also evidence of
conflict. Relationships between trial oversight committees were influenced by stakeholders’ priorities, both
organisational and individual. Good communication following specific, recognised routes played a central role
in ensuring that relationships were productive and trial oversight efficient. Participants described the possession of
power over trials as a shifting political landscape, and there was lack of clarity regarding the roles and accountability
of each committee, the sponsor and funder. Stakeholders’ perceptions of their own power over a trial, and the power
of others, influenced relationships between those involved in trial oversight.
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Conclusions: Recent developments in trial design and conduct have been accompanied by changes in roles
and relationships between trial oversight groups. Recognising and respecting the value of differing priorities
among those involved in running trials is key to successful relationships between committees, funders and
sponsors. Clarity regarding appropriate lines of communication, roles and accountability is needed. We present 10
evidence-based recommendations to inform updates to international trial guidance, particularly the Medical Research
Council guidelines.
Keywords: Randomised controlled trials, Trial oversight, Trial steering committee, Trial management, Ethnography,
Qualitative researchBackground
The oversight of clinical trials aims to safeguard study
participants, and ensure that trials are run in accordance
with Good Clinical Practice (GCP), and trial data are of
high calibre (i.e. reliable) and collected in a reasonable
timeframe. In the United Kingdom (UK), the Medical
Research Council (MRC) guidelines for Good Clinical
Practice (1998) define a three-committee trial oversight
structure for MRC trials and this approach has been
broadly adopted in the UK [1]. These committees are: a
Trial Management Group (TMG) that oversees the day-
to-day running of the trial, a Data Monitoring Committee
(DMC) that reviews accumulating data and a Trial
Steering Committee (TSC), with independent members,
that provides oversight and supervision [2]. The MRC
guidelines also acknowledge additional stakeholders: the
funding bodies which pay for trials, and the sponsors
that take responsibility for initiating, managing, and/or
financing the trial and ensuring that appropriate standards
are met [2, 3].
As trial methods develop, oversight guidance also re-
quires updating [1, 4–6]. Academic Clinical Trials Units
(CTUs) have come to play an increasingly important
trial oversight role, working within TMGs and TSCs. Al-
though the MRC guidelines explicitly mention ‘MRC
Units’ and ‘Trials Offices’, they do not refer to CTUs.
CTUs are specialist units with a specific remit to work
with the leading investigators to design, conduct, analyse
and publish clinical trials and other studies [7]. CTUs
employ staff with expertise in trial design, trial coordin-
ation and statistics, and sometimes in qualitative re-
search and health economics, who support trials
through to completion. There has also been a change in
terminology: the MRC guidelines defined ‘Principal In-
vestigator’ (PI) as the person responsible for initiating
the trial and running it on a day-to-day basis, including
managing the budget, ensuring clear lines of communica-
tion, analysis, reporting and dissemination [2]. However,
in practice these responsibilities are rarely discharged by
one person; ‘Chief Investigator’ has become the generally
preferred term for the trial lead [8], with the term ‘PI’ re-
lating to the person(s) responsible for running the trials inthe trial sites or leading the CTU activities. We use these
definitions here.
There is also growing empirical evidence that trial
guidance requires updating in response to advances in
trial planning and conduct [1, 4–6]. In 2005, the
DAMOCLES study of the role of DMCs in trial over-
sight found that the lines of communication recom-
mended in the guidelines (the DMC reporting to the
TSC and, when appropriate, to the funder) were not
born out in practice: the DMC Chair often reported the
recommendations of the DMC to the CI, TSC or spon-
sor [4]. In a recent survey of registered CTUs, Conroy
et al. found much heterogeneity in the implementation
of trial oversight processes and confusion regarding the
diverse roles of stakeholders [1]. An expert panel which
discussed the roles and responsibilities of trial oversight
committees raised concerns regarding the role of fun-
ders in appointing independent TSC members [5]. Simi-
larly, tensions and ambiguities in the roles expected of
TSCs and attributes valued in TSC members can impact
the TSCs’ quality assurance role [6].
Clear, updated guidelines on trial oversight which re-
flect current practices and requirements are, therefore,
needed. Research has highlighted the complexity of rela-
tionships between trial oversight groups and the primary
role of those relationships in enabling quality trial over-
sight [4, 5]. However, despite the impact of relationships
on the quality of trial oversight and conduct, no previous
research has explored these relationships or their impact
on trial oversight. We therefore aimed to examine the
relationships between all the stakeholders involved in
trial oversight (TSC, TMG, CTU, DMC, sponsor and
funder) and how they affect the trial oversight process,
to inform future international guidelines.
Methods
We conducted a cross-sectional ethnographic study [9]
to explore relationships between trial oversight groups
and their impact, using overt non-participant observa-
tion of TSC and TMG meetings and interviews with in-
dependent and non-independent TSC members, trial
sponsors, funders and CIs. This approach is highly
Table 1 Observation schedule (summary)
Topic Field notes
Data collection Date, location, observer
Pre-meeting Setting (including diagram of room layout)
Arrivals (e.g. who arrives when, what order?)
Pre-meeting talk (e.g. verbal and non-verbal
communication)
Main meeting Start time, who starts/how?
Organisation of meeting (e.g. role of Chair, agenda,
hand-outs, atmosphere)
Chair (e.g. manner of facilitating discussion, leadership
style, management of tension/conflict, influence on
decision-making)
Content of discussion (e.g. issues raised, knowledge/
information drawn upon, recommendations made)
Group interactions and decision-making
(e.g. concerns raised, individuals’
contributions and roles in discussion, verbal and
non-verbal communication, decision-making)
Mode of participation (e.g. via teleconference)
Action points/tasks (e.g. what is to be done, by whom,
by when?)
Time interval to next meeting
End time, length of meeting, who ends/how?
Post-meeting Interactions and behaviour (e.g. who leaves first,
alone/together?)
General impressions
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ing, as the data generated relates to what occurs in prac-
tice as well as what is reported to occur, and findings
from observations could be explored further in the inter-
views. Findings from observation of TSC and TMG
meetings were triangulated [10] and integrated with
interview findings to give a rich, multi-perspective ac-
count. The methods have been reported previously and
are summarised here for completeness [6]. Our research is
situated within a post-positivist, minimally realist para-
digm appropriate to applied health services research [11].
Sample and setting
Sampling was guided by the selection of ‘information-
rich cases’ that would provide insights to meet our study
aim [12]. First, we selected eight randomised controlled
trials (RCTs) which had a challenge to address, e.g. re-
cruitment issue or protocol amendment. Relationships
between trial oversight groups are more clearly revealed
in trials experiencing challenges, as decisions need to be
made on how to proceed. All included trials had a rou-
tine TSC meeting planned within the study period
(March 2013 – January 2014). To help ensure represen-
tativeness, the RCTs covered a range of clinical topics,
settings, interventions and oversight committee structures.
RCTs were identified through the UKCRC Registered
Clinical Trials Unit Network [13] and a major UK funder
of trials.
Second, we used purposive sampling to select for
interview independent and non-independent TSC mem-
bers with possible differing perspectives on, and involve-
ment in, the selected RCTs. Independent TSC members
included TSC Chairs and Patient and Public Involve-
ment (PPI) representatives; non-independent members
included TMG members such as members of the CTU.
Data collection continued for each trial until data satur-
ation was reached, i.e. no new themes emerged during
data analysis [14]. To gain wider perspectives, supple-
mentary interviews were conducted with representatives
of a purposive selection of trial funders, sponsors and
CIs with experience of other challenging trials.
Data collection
All observational and interview data were collected by
the same female academic (AD), an experienced qualita-
tive researcher with a PhD in health services research
who was not previously known to the participants. The
research was presented as an ethnographic study of trial
oversight.
Observational data
For each trial, the researcher attended, observed and
audio-recorded one TSC meeting and relevant TMG
meetings during the study period. Field notes were takenduring and after the meetings, guided by a standardised
observation schedule (Table 1) developed on the basis of
established guidance [9], prior studies of trial oversight
[4] and our research questions.
Interview data
TSC members were invited for interview by the relevant
trial CI or by the study researcher. Interviews were con-
ducted before or after the TSC meeting depending on
availability and preference. Supplementary interviews
were conducted with funder, sponsor and CI representa-
tives, identified via snowball sampling [15]. Interviews
were face-to-face or by telephone, depending on partici-
pant preference, and were recorded, transcribed verba-
tim and checked by the researcher prior to analysis. One
interview was with two people (two sponsor representa-
tives, #5 and #6), the rest were conducted individually.
Semi-structured interview topics guides (summarised in
Table 2) were formulated based on the academic literature
regarding trial oversight and the research team’s expertise.
Data analysis
Observational data (meeting recordings and field notes)
and interview data were analysed thematically [16]. Analysis
by the primary researcher (AD) occurred alongside data
collection, to enable emerging findings to inform subse-
quent data collection. An initial coding framework was de-
veloped using techniques of constant comparison [17] and
a combination of deductive line-by-line coding, based on
the research aims, and inductive analysis. The primary
Table 2 Interview topic guides (summary)
Participant groups Topics discussed in interviews
Chief Investigator, Trial
manager
The trial: history of the trial, details of the
trial, current stage, successes, current and
anticipated challenges
The Trial Steering Committee/Trial Management
Group (TSC/TMG): expectations of TMG/TSC,
composition of TMG/TSC, selection of
members and chairs, nature of the group’s
decision-making and members’ involvement,
examples of actioned group recommendations,
impact of TMG/TSC, communication between
TSC and TMG, relationship and communication
between trial oversight committees and
with funder
TSC members The trial: history of participation in the TSC,
views of TSC, relationships with other members,
value of TSC meetings, TSC’s role in
decision-making, relationship and
communication between TSC, TMG and other
trial oversight committees TSC meetings:
meeting organisation, Chair and leadership,
communication during meeting, decision-making,
agreeing and assigning actions, communication
of actions to other groups/trial personnel
TMG members The trial: history of participation in the TMG,
views of TMG, relationships with other members,
views of TMG and TSC, value of TMG/TSC,
TMG/TSC role in decision-making, relationship
and communication between TSC, TMG and
other trial oversight committees TMG meetings:
meeting organisation, Chair and leadership,
communication during meeting, decision-making,
agreeing and assigning actions, communication
of actions to other groups/trial personnel, role
of Patient and Public Involvement (PPI)
Trial funders Funders’ expectations and views of TMGs/TSCs,
process of selecting TSC, examples of trial
oversight working well, examples where trial
oversight has not worked well, different models
of TSCs, role of TSC Chair, role of PPI, role of the
trial funder, regulatory bodies, recommendations
Sponsors Sponsors’ expectations and views of TMGs/TSCs,
role of sponsor in trial, responsibilities of
sponsor, relationship between trial oversight
committees, sponsor and funder, challenges
faced by trials, role and value of TMGs/TSCs
TMG Trial Management Group, TSC Trial Steering Committee, PPI Patient and
Public Involvement
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(AS, SM, GS and HC) monthly to review data analysis and
emerging findings. During the meetings, the coding frame
was refined, and data scrutinised for disconfirming and
confirming perspectives. AD coded all the data. All the
interview and observational data from four of the RCTs
were also independently coded by another researcher (AS,
SM, GS or HC). Identified minor differences were dis-
cussed by the team, resolved and integrated into the ana-
lysis. Finally, a narrative summary of the findings, which
integrated data from the interviews and observations,
was constructed (LS, AD). Triangulation attended to
divergence and convergence in the datasets and thedifferent perspectives represented [9]. Data analysis
was managed in NVivo v.10 [18].
Data have been anonymised to protect confidentiality,
with ID codes and trial number used to identify quotes
from interviews. Observational data from meeting re-
cordings and field notes are assigned to a trial number.
Ethical approval
The University of Bristol Faculty of Health Sciences
Research Ethics Committee approved the study. National
Health Service (NHS) research governance approval was
gained where data collection took place on NHS premises
or included NHS staff. All interview participants gave
written informed consent.
Results
Data collected
We observed and audio-recorded eight TSC and, six
TMG meetings (range 40–120 min in length). We con-
ducted 66 interviews with 52 individuals. Thirty were
TMG members for the included trials, 14 were inde-
pendent TSC members, and the remainder were other
relevant informants working in this field (n = 8) (Table 3).
All those approached agreed to be interviewed. Interviews
ranged from 19 to 148 min (mean 58 min). The median
number of interviews per trial was 10, range 6–11.
Findings
Five main themes regarding relationships between the
stakeholders involved in trial oversight were identified:
(1) Collaboration within the TMG and role of the CTU;
(2) Collaboration and conflict between oversight com-
mittees; (3) Priorities; (4) Communication between trial
oversight groups and (5) Power and accountability (sub-
themes: 5a. Perceived power and accountability; 5b.
Impact of perceived power on relationships).
Collaboration within the TMG and role of the CTU
Evidence of collaborative relationships between those in-
volved in delivering trials demonstrated the benefits of
trial teams bringing together experts with complemen-
tary skills who collaborate with mutual respect. PPI
members brought an awareness of the patient partici-
pant perspective (and their in-trial conduct will be ex-
plored in detail in a separate publication):
‘My actual role, as I see it, is to represent the
patients as much as I possibly can, to make sure
their interests are dealt with correctly, that they are
not just used as pawns in the research’.
[#35, PPI representative, RCT 7]
CTU members, who rarely had a clinical background, re-
lied on the CI for subject expertise, while CIs relied on the
Table 3 Characteristics of interview participants
Participant ID Role Relationship to trial Gender Trial number Trial subject area
01 TSC Chair (clinician) Independent M 1, 2 Oncology
02 Senior trial project lead TMG M 1, 5 Oncology
03 TSC coordinator P1 TMG M 1, 2 Oncology
04 TSC coordinator P2 TSC administrator F 1, 2 Oncology
05 Sponsor representative TMG F 1, 2 Oncology
06 Sponsor representative Observer at TSC meeting M 1, 2 Oncology
07 Trial manager TMG F 1 Oncology
08 CI TMG F 2 Oncology
09 Trial manager TMG F 2 Oncology
10 Trial manager TMG M 3 Arthritis
11 Senior statistician TMG M 3 Arthritis
12 Senior trial manager TMG F 3 Arthritis
13 Statistician TMG M 3 Arthritis
14A Co-CIa TMG M 3 Arthritis
15 TSC Chair (clinician) Independent M 3 Arthritis
16 Trial manager TMG F 4 Frailty
17 TSC Chair (methodologist) Independent M 4 Frailty
18 CI TMG M 4 Frailty
19 TMG Chair TMG F 4 Frailty
20 TMG member TMG F 4 Frailty
21 Trial manager TMG F 5 Oncology
22 Statistician TMG F 5 Oncology
23 CI TMG M 5 Oncology
24 TSC member Independent M 5 Oncology
25 TSC member Independent M 5 Oncology
26 Trial manager TMG F 6 Urology
27 Trial manager TMG F 6 Urology
28 Statistician TMG M 6 Urology
29 CI TMG M 6 Urology
30 TSC Chair (clinician) Independent M 6 Urology
31 TSC member Independent M 6 Urology
32 TMG member TMG M 6 Urology
33 Trial manager TMG F 7 Psychology
34 CI TMG F 7 Psychology
35 PPI Representative TMG M 7 Psychology
36 TSC Chair (clinician) Independent F 7 Psychology
37 TSC member (statistician) Independent M 7 Psychology
38 TSC member Independent M 7 Psychology
39 CTU Director TMG F 7 Psychology
40 Senior trial manager TMG F 7 Psychology
41 Trial manager TMG F 8 Oncology
42 TSC Chair (clinician) Independent M 8 Oncology
43A PPI representative Independent F 8 Oncology
43B PPI representative Independent M 8 Oncology
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Table 3 Characteristics of interview participants (Continued)
Participant ID Role Relationship to trial Gender Trial number Trial subject area
44 Senior statistician TMG M 8 Oncology
45 Sponsor representative Independent M 8 Oncology
46 CI of another trial/member of TSCs n/a M n/a n/a
47 Funder representative n/a M n/a n/a
48 Sponsor representative n/a M n/a n/a
49 Funder representative n/a F n/a n/a
50 Senior statistician n/a F n/a n/a
51 Funder representative n/a F n/a n/a
aNote: the Co-CI from trial 3 (14B, male) was not interviewed, but was recorded during a meeting (Table 4)
CI Chief Investigator, TMG Trial Management Group, TSC Trial Steering Committee
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processes, and trial science, conduct and regulation:
‘Things work well in trials in general when you’ve
got the clinician side who are on top of all of
the kind of treatments and that kind of thing, and
then you’ve got us lot here who make it all work.
The clinicians don’t always understand how much
time it takes to put in amendments and how much
trouble it can cause at sites… But without them,
obviously there’d be no trial’. [#41, Trial manager
(TM), RCT 8]
‘We look to [CIs] to make sure that we
are understanding a lot of the background and the
issues in clinics. We have to make sure that [they]
understand the issues relating to the design of the
operational aspects of the study.’ [#02, Senior trial
project lead, RCTs 1 and 5]
The TMG meeting for trial 5 was an example of a col-
laborative and productive exchange between CI and
CTU lead. The CI introduced what he considered to be
minor changes to trial data collection:
‘So what we wanted the group to approve was just
formal collaboration with [another researcher], which
seems to be pretty straightforward. Yes, they just want
to take some extra [tissue] samples from patients in
the trial, they don’t want to do anything to them,
apart from that. So I just formally wanted to request
the TMG approve this’. [#23, CI, RCT 5]
The CTU senior lead guided the CI through the reasons
why the proposed changes would require a protocol
amendment and both parties agreed a way forward:
‘Okay, so we need to think about what the implications
are. What data they are looking for, whether this is
data that we would be able to get out of the centres.Were the centres going to struggle to collect that
information? Whether they want this data released,
what the impact is for us? I guess this another protocol
amendment?’ [#2, Senior project trial lead, RCTs 1
and 5]
‘Yes.’ [#23, CI, RCT 5]
‘So it’s not a small amount of work required, by our end
I suspect.’ [#2, Senior project trial lead, RCTs 1 and 5]
Fundamental to good collaboration in this case was
openness to benefitting from the knowledge and skills of
others. CTU staff reported their advisory role was easier
if CIs were open to learning and collaboration, but this
depended on the CI’s personality:
‘They don’t need to understand it [all of the operational
details of running a trial], so long as they are the kind of
person who can admit, “Okay, I don’t understand this
and so you’re going to advise me”… But I have worked
with some CIs who are a little bit more difficult and
who maybe don’t understand how trials work and try
and argue sometimes’. [#41, TM, RCT 8]
Trial managers (TMs), usually employed by a CTU,
were key in supporting the CI by running day-to-day
trial management. TM tasks included keeping an eye on
deadlines and recruitment targets, arranging TSC and
TMG meetings, and coordinating or implementing deci-
sions made:
‘I probably have the most input in the day-to-day
management of the trial, so I update on trial progress.
I would also usually be responsible for implementing
the decisions that are made’. [#33, TM, RCT 7]
‘It is very much a project management role when it gets
to this stage: keeping an eye on deadlines and making
sure that we achieve our targets.’ [#27, TM, RCT 6]
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frequent enough to deal quickly with emerging challenges,
with the necessary frequency dependent on the trial:
‘You’ve got weekly meetings with a sort of smaller
group of people, that’s the agility you need to make
decisions, even once a month to be honest is probably
not quite agile enough for a TMG’. [#31, Independent
TSC member, RCT 6]
Where relationships between CI and TM worked well
and CIs were confident in the trial team, TMs facilitated
the research process and supported the CI by providing
day-to-day management of the trials. The CIs appre-
ciated this:
‘When you are working with a good team, it is not that
stressful, there is a lot of satisfaction from it’.
[#29, CI, RCT 6]
Collaboration and conflict between oversight committees
There was evidence of how the TSC delivered good trial
oversight and guarded the rigour of the trial by raising
for discussion key features of trial progress, such as re-
cruitment across sites and to different trial arms,
whether to release interim data, and statistical analysis
plans. Reaching and delivering recommendations to im-
prove trial conduct involved collaboration and discus-
sion between trial oversight committees. For example,
trial 2 had been threatened with closure due to poor re-
cruitment, and the TSC had taken the ‘highly unusual’
(#08, CI, RCT 2) step of authorising an interim release
of data to reassure clinicians recruiting to the trial that
there had been no safety issues to date. This involved
the TSC, DMC and TMG reaching consensus, and re-
sulted in the trial being kept open, as the CI explained:
‘It has been slow to recruit, but it is continuing to
recruit. The TSC and the TMG at the [funder] have
been very innovative, sensible and imaginative in
trying to stretch our funding. [Interviewee laughs]…
What was clear from the interim release was that
we did not appear to be doing harm. That boosted
recruitment and it encouraged clinicians to know
that it was worth having the conversation: “I don’t
seem to be doing harm with this trial, and it remains
a very important question to answer”. That allowed
us to maintain our funding and to stretch it’.
[#08, CI RCT 2]
In trial 6, however, the CI saw TSC meetings predomi-
nantly as a ‘rubber stamping process’ (#29, CI, RCT 6)
and questioned the value of the TSC to the trial. This
was in contrast to the TM and senior statistician, whofelt that the TSC had been valuable in improving data
return rates. The TSC Chair himself reflected on how
the TSC wasn’t currently influencing the trial ‘because
it’s going quite well’ (#30, TSC Chair, RCT 6), suggesting
collaboration is most needed when problems arise:
‘There wasn’t very much on the agenda really, it’s
rather formulaic in that we always, you know, the
recruitments and the questionnaires and how many
have been filled in and then well what the DMC have
said and how the thing is just going generally, because
it’s going quite well, there isn’t a lot to say really. So
it’s… we have to hold the meeting because you know
that’s in the protocol really for a couple of times a
year. So I don’t think we did anything or said anything
earth shattering… I never know what people think
about these things but they all come along, probably
because they have to’. [#30, TSC Chair, RCT 6]
Trial 7 exemplified both conflict and collaboration in
trial oversight. At the time of the study, trial recruitment
had been stopped due to concerns about patient safety.
This decision was taken after the DMC noted a safety
signal due to increased hospitalisations in one of the trial
arms, and recommended to the TSC the trial should
stop recruiting, but continue the allocated intervention
with patients already randomised. The TSC considered
the advice of the DMC and asked that both the recruit-
ment and delivery of the intervention be stopped, with
only follow-up data collection continuing to ascertain
reasons participants had sought help. During this
process, the TSC asked to be unblinded to the data and
requested that the DMC stand down. The TSC’s decision
to cease recruitment, informed by the DMC’s recom-
mendation, was initially distressing for the CI and TMG,
and there was conflict:
‘Our position then was, as a TSC… we have taken
decisions here, and we are absolutely obligated to
explain those decisions. The meeting started in a
quite hostile fashion, because the PIs and the CIs
were just basically saying, “What the hell has
happened here? What have you done?” We had
to get it across to them, and it was a very good
meeting. Because by the end of it, everybody was
on the same page. The previously hostile PIs were
actually quite grateful that the situation had
been explained to them. They now had a
mechanism to engage their patients’.
[#38, Independent TSC member, RCT 7]
The TMG subsequently collaborated well with the
TSC to ensure that the closure of the trial was carried
out optimally for the participants:
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concern for participants and the welfare of
participants in the trial… everybody had agreed on
that, and it was just disagreement about how to deal
with that’. [#39, CTU Director, RCT 7]
Priorities
The degree to which relationships between those in-
volved in trial oversight were collaborative and con-
structive was influenced by stakeholders’ priorities.
These priorities, whether individual or organisational,
were associated with individual’s perceptions of what
was required to maintain or advance their professional
reputations and careers, as well as their belief in the
value of the trial. For example, CIs were often reported
in interviews to be personally invested in the success of
their trials in a way that other members of the TMG
were not:
‘I think he treats [the trial] as his baby, because he is
the Chief Investigator… You kind of think he’s really
personal about it and I think, you know, if the trial
did get closed he’d be like pretty upset about it…
he’s really highly motivated and driven… anything
possible to keep it going’. [#13, Statistician, RCT 3]
In contrast, members of the CTU perceived them-
selves to be more objective, detached and realistic about
the progress of the trial:
‘Obviously [the CI] is very close to trial and we all
want to succeed, but we’ve also got to be realistic
about what is happening and… I mean, as I say, I
try and look at things from an external point of
view as well, try and take a step back’.
[#11, Senior statistician, RCT 3]
A director of a funding body also contrasted CIs’ per-
ceived closeness to the trial with the CTU’s objectivity,
drawing attention to the CTU’s organisational priority of
focussing on trials which meet recruitment and follow-
up targets:
‘The CI very, very rarely wants to have his trial closed,
because it’s the sign of failure. The trials unit… can see
a dead horse that they have sitting on their portfolio’.
[#51, Funder representative]
For this representative, the perceived objective nature
of the CTU was part of the ‘professionalism’ central to
running a trial they would define as ‘rigorous’:
‘It should be impossible for an investigator to run a
trial that isn’t done through… an accredited trialsunit… There should be no investigators as they used to
be when I started doing trials on the back of an
envelope basically in a little office somewhere, dolling
out the drugs probably – it’s not on anymore… What
we are talking about now is the whole professionalism
of running trials… nobody should be doing this
out-with a professional trials unit, and there are many
of them now… And if anybody has a halfway decent
idea for a trial they need to be developing it with a
trials unit’. [#51, Funder representative]
There was consensus among respondents that the or-
ganisational priority of independent TSC members was to
protect participant wellbeing while ensuring scientific
quality (see [6] for further details on the role of the TSC):
‘I think in a philosophical way, [the role of the TSC] is
to protect the patient, and then the integrity of the
trial… it puts the interest of the patient first and
foremost. As an independent, you are making sure that
that is observed’. [#37, Independent TSC member,
RCT 7]
This role was contrasted with the DMC’s prioritisation
of participant safety, which one person attributed only
to this committee:
‘The safety of the patient is the exclusive reserve of the
DMC’. [#37, Independent TSC member, RCT 7]
The DMC’s primary role in trial oversight was re-
ported to be reviewing accumulating, unblinded trial
data, and, when needed, raising concerns for further
consideration by the TSC, which would take the decision
to act:
‘The DMC can see the data and say there’s a problem,
but they won’t know why there’s a problem… their job
is to look at the data, not completely in isolation, but
looking for signals, identifying the signals, passing that
on to a group [the TSC] that then can look at things in
more depth’. [#40, Senior TM, RCT 7]
‘The TSC does not have to take the DMC’s advice,
because it has to see a greater picture. It almost
certainly will [take DMC advice]. But every so often,
the person that the subcommittee[sic] reports to should
be able to turn around and say, “Well, no, based on
other things that we have to take account of, your
recommendation does not overwhelm”.’
[#38, Independent TSC member, RCT 7]
As independent bodies, the TSC’s and DMC’s organ-
isational priorities were perceived as a way of keeping in
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holders, such as the CI or funder, might bring to trial
oversight, and hence protecting participants’ wellbeing.
Differences in stakeholders’ priorities caused tension
and conflict within and between trial oversight commit-
tees. For example, Table 4 presents an extract from a
TMG meeting in which a Co-CI, jointly responsible for
the trial, argued to change the statistical parameters of
the analysis, because he feared the closure of the trial
otherwise. He appealed to the trial team’s ethical duty to
participants to continue with follow-up, while the TMG
members urged the Co-CIs to adhere to GCP (field
notes, TMG meeting trial 3). A compromise was reached
prior to the TSC meeting, with the Co-CIs agreeing to
reduce power from 90% to 80%. This was endorsed at
the next TSC meeting.
Communication between trial oversight groups
Good communication played a central role in ensuring
relationships between trial oversight stakeholders were
productive and the process efficient. The TM was first
point of contact for the trial and often acted as the pri-
mary channel of communication between the CI and
trial oversight groups. Controlling aspects of intergroup
communication allowed the TM to:Table 4 Differences in priorities causing conflict – example
from RCT 3
#14B, Co-Chief Investigator (Co-CI), RCT 3: ‘So it might be also helpful
[trial statistician], to look at the scenarios of seeing if there was a greater
difference. I’m not suggesting that’s our primary strategy, I think the
best strategy is to go for power. But I think it would be nice to have
the scenarios of looking for a 70% difference and a 90% difference. So
(trial statistician), would you be able to just do that?’
#13, Statistician, RCT 3: ‘Yeah, we can do that, but when I was speaking
to [senior trial statistician], yesterday he said it’s not really good practice
to meddle with the difference coz you know…’
#14B, Co-CI, RCT 3: ‘Well it’s very easy to say that but the other option is
the trial stops, do you see what I mean? So good practice is to make
sure that we fulfil the commitments of the families who have consented
to this study. So we appreciate what good practice is, but I think it’s also
looking for a number of scenarios in which we can present to everyone
including the Data Monitoring Committee, the (Trial) Steering Committee
and the funders to find a pragmatic solution to a problem of recruitment,
okay. So it’s just to have those figures available really for discussion’.
#12, Senior trial manager (TM), RCT 3: ‘[CI], I think it’s just being aware
that obviously if you’re changing the difference that you’re looking for,
then you are leaving yourself open to criticism, so you need to be
ready to…’
#14B, Co-CI, RCT 3: ‘We are –’
#14A, Co-CI, RCT 3: ‘We are aware. [Senior trial manager], we’re open to
ever greater criticism, so this is not been talked about lightly or picked
from thin air. There’s a real and present danger that if we go up in front
of (funder) in (month) not having met our target of [x]
patients in the last 6 months, there is a very real present clear danger
that they will stop the trial. That is not in the best interest of the
patients who have participated, that’s not in the best interest of any of us’.
Co-CI Co-Chief Investigator, RCT randomised controlled trial, DMC Data
Monitoring Committee, TSC Trial Steering Committee, TM Trial manager‘…make the message clear …to make sure we’re singing
from the same hymn sheet…’. [#02, Senior trial project
lead, RCT 1 and 5]
‘Communication is definitely key. It helps that all the
communication goes through me. I think the TSC and
(DMC) …look for emails from my email account, and
they know to respond to that.’ [#10, TM, RCT 3]
The CI and TM of trial 7 attributed their previous suc-
cess in dealing with a challenging issue (the early stop-
ping of recruitment) to the clarity of communication
initiated by the CTU and shared with all trial oversight
parties:
‘The most important thing is to communicate
everything and expediently, and keep communications
going between all groups… Transparency is
important… and the relationships between the TMG,
the CTU and the TSC were really vital, that’s why it
worked so well’. [#40, Senior TM, RCT 7]
Mutual respect between all members of the TMG and
TSC was noted during the observation of trial 7’s TSC
meeting. However, those involved in trial 7 also de-
scribed a period of conflict with the trial DMC during
the same challenging episode. The DMC, instead of
communicating through the TSC in the expected man-
ner, was reported to have directly contacted the TMG to
gain more information:
‘The communication issue there came up, which
is, to be honest I don’t see it as my job to
communicate with DMC. The route, we clarified –
the route was a bit unclear way back. But during
the recruitment stoppage, we were careful to clarify
that the route of communication was between us
and the TSC to the DMC… They advise the TSC,
not us… The trouble originally was DMC badgering
us’. [#34, CI, RCT 7]
The CTU Director in this instance took on the role of
arbitrator, clarifying acceptable lines of inter-group com-
munication in trial oversight:
‘The role of the DMC is to be independent, and
they jeopardise their independence if they’re too
close to the trial team – it’s not that they shouldn’t
make a request for information from a TM, but it
should go through some other route. The DMC reports
directly to the TSC. That’s the charter that everybody
uses… The first thing I did was to stop communication
between the TM and the CI, and the DMC’.
[#39, CTU Director, RCT 7]
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written into the trial’s charter. Her intervention was
timely, as it prevented the process of early stoppage of
recruiting going ‘pear-shaped… the CTU’s reputation
was at stake’ (#39, CTU Director, RCT 7).
Clarity regarding appropriate lines of communication,
a central point of contact responsible for coordinating
communication, and consideration in advance of the
CTU’s role as arbiter were seen as facilitators of commu-
nication between trial oversight stakeholders and trial
oversight:
‘There needs to be really, really accurate and
complete communication between research team
led by chief investigator and the TSC, between TSC
and DMC, and these are both bi-directional not
uni-directional. Then, as the need arises, between TSC
and other stakeholders, which, importantly would
include the funder’. [#37, Independent TSC member,
RCT 7]
Power and accountability
Perceived power and accountability Interview partici-
pants described the possession of power over trials as a
shifting political landscape. The more experienced of
those interviewed talked of a time when TSCs were
mostly accountable to sponsors and funders had a ‘more
hands off ’ approach (#39, CTU Director, RCT 7). They
described how a large funder of trials had now changed
its relationship with TSCs, requiring them to report dir-
ectly to the funder and seeking to appoint independent
TSC members itself. A representative from the funder
reported that their appointment of TSC members had
arisen as a protective mechanism against poor trial over-
sight leading to flawed trial methodology:
‘They [the TSC] didn’t come to this with any
independent scrutiny. So when a lot of cross
over and, in effect, contamination between the arms
was going on, the TSC were quite happy to accept
that… We actually discharged the Chair of the
[Trial] Steering Committee and appointed our own …
experienced TSC Chair who we briefed to make
it clear that what we wanted from them’.
[#47, Funder representative]
Others also recognised that public sector funders were
responsible to the government for how research funds
were spent, whereas the TSC’s responsibility was narrower:
‘If you’re the funder you’ve got power and
responsibility, you have still got to make sure this stuff
delivers otherwise the governments are going to getupset, so you know you have got responsibility there.
The TSC, yeah it has responsibilities but they are very
much within … perhaps a narrower focus of
responsibility, …they have a responsibility to do what
they are supposed to do according to their charter. It
isn’t really the TSCs responsibility if the whole thing
goes wrong’. [#31, Independent TSC member, RCT 6]
However, the funder appointing its own independent
TSC members was perceived by some as the funder trying
to control the trial, by shifting accountability and loyalty
of the TSC from the trial to the funder. Interviewees
expressed concern over this change, for example:
‘The [funder], they make it very, very clear: it says the
primary TSC reporting line is via the Chair to the
[funder] programme director. Forget about the sponsor,
so this is the funder who is taking control of the TSC
and whereas if you look at the research governance stuff
I’m sure that it was actually the sponsor who the TSC
should be reporting to, not the funder…
They’re definitely trying to have more control of the
TSC so their loyalty is more to the funder rather than
to the sponsor or to the CI… I think the TSC has a
very important role… it’s worrying that [funders] are
trying to dilute their responsibilities or yeah just
distorting the relationship by… making them much
more a tool of the funder rather than a source of
independent scientific advice …the TSC to my mind
has become almost a puppet’. [#50, Senior statistician]
Other participants thought the funder’s power and the
TSC’s lack of power was almost inevitable given the fun-
der’s ability to withdraw financial support:
‘At the end of the day, the guy with the money is the
guy with the power, and if the funder says do it, you’re
going to do it … because they’ve got the ball. They’ll
take it away if they don’t like it’.
[#31, Independent TSC member, RCT 6]
‘The TSC is, after all, it’s an advisory group isn’t
it? It's not an executive group, they don't decide on
what you can and can't do and they don't really have
any control over the funding. So they're there to advise
the (funder), who then make the decision.’
[#29, CI, RCT 6]
This statement contradicts the charter for many TSCs,
where the TSC is executive for many aspects of the trial.
The question of who has overall responsibility for de-
ciding whether a trial continues was contested by
some. Some participants pointed out that a funder
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that the trial had to stop, even if this was likely:
‘The question was should they have the power to stop
it? I think they’ve got the power – no, the only power
they’ve got is to withdraw the funding I think, because
the actual protocol, as far as I’m aware, is the
property of the trialists. I would have thought the
trialists are able to continue the trial even if the
[funder] withdraw the funding … from a pragmatic
point of view, then most trials would probably stop’.
[#32, TMG member, RCT 6]
‘No. Because they’re thinking in terms of money as
opposed to whether it’s a good idea being done
properly. What matters is the question whether it’s
being done properly and whether you can get an
answer, and the funding is just a different matter
altogether.’ [#01, TSC Chair, RCTs 1 and 2]
Sponsor representatives, a funding director and two
TSC Chairs all asserted that they had overall responsibil-
ity for deciding whether a trial progresses:
‘I suppose officially it would be me really… I can’t
imagine the circumstance where I would be telling
[names] and the statistician and Director of [CTU]
you know, this is rubbish it’s got to stop… but of course
it would be my job to do that, it’s in the sort of
charter’. [#30, TSC Chair, RCT 6]
‘The buck stops with us. They [the TSC] do slightly
more than advise I guess. We would certainly look to
them, I mean this is slightly confused, not confused,
but there is a tripartite role really for oversight of
trials because there’s us as funder, there’s the TSC
employing independent advice but accountable to
us as funder and the other obviously is the sponsor…
the local university or hospital and they obviously
have a role as well and to some extent the TSC needs
to be accountable a little bit to the sponsor as well.’
[#47, Funder representative]
‘The TSC guides the sponsor, and ultimately the
decision to move forward or not with the study sits with
the sponsor.’ [#45, Sponsor representative, RCT 8]
‘[Funders] like to pretend they are but they’re not, are
they. Quite clearly not, so the buck doesn’t stop with
them, their role, the buck stops with the sponsor.’
[#48, Sponsor representative]
These accounts of who has the power and responsibility
to stop a trial demonstrate variation in practices andprocesses and a significant lack of clarity about roles in
trial oversight. Participants’ beliefs regarding which over-
sight group had the ultimate power over a trial were
influenced by their working environment and allegiances,
e.g. employees of one of the funders believed that spon-
sors had overall power, while other funder directors and
their employees believed that power lay with the funders.
All these parties may be correct: the funder can stop a
trial by withdrawing money and the sponsor by retract-
ing their indemnity. The TSC Chair could no longer
offer her or his support, but this role would be replaced.
Each group’s reasons for stopping the trial will vary, e.g.
lack of value for money, data protection breaches or pa-
tient safety. Instead of perceiving this situation to inevit-
ably end in conflict, a CTU Director viewed it as
providing ‘checks and balances’:
‘Well, you could see it as checks and balances, and
they would stop it for different reasons … I see it as
just checks and balances, but then, if you’ve got a
situation of conflict, what you need is a process for
resolving it … It was a huge relief to me when I went
and looked at the charter, because I hadn’t been
involved in setting it up, so I didn’t read the charter
until this happened. I was so relieved to find that there
was something in there that offered a way forward …
It gave me a mandate to interfere. [Laughter]’.
[#39, CTU Director, RCT 7]
In the hierarchy of power in trial oversight, the CI
could be perceived to be at the bottom: despite having
(co-)initiated the trial process and being clinically
accountable for the trial’s success or failure, CIs were re-
ported by one TSC member to have ‘plenty of responsi-
bility without power’ (#31, Independent TSC member,
RCT 6).
Impact of perceived power on relationships Trial
stakeholders’ perceptions of their own power over a trial,
and the power of other stakeholders, influenced relation-
ships between the oversight bodies. Funders were seen
as ‘the overall boss’ (#38, Independent TSC member,
RCT 7), with others answerable to them. Participants
discussed, with trepidation, how funders contacted CIs
or TMs of trials facing challenges and called the CI to
monitoring meetings to account for trial progress. Sev-
eral participants had experienced these meetings, while
others had heard about them. The TMG of trial 3 was
due its second such meeting and was still having difficul-
ties with recruitment. During the observed TMG meet-
ing, which the two CIs attended via teleconference, the
stress caused by this was evident from their tone of
voice, rapid speech, and interruptions when CTU mem-
bers were talking (field notes, TMG RCT 3; see Table 4).
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ing meeting; her account highlights its stressful and diffi-
cult nature:
‘[The funders] didn’t actually call me a liar, but they
said, “We don’t believe you”… which at the time made
me very angry … well, it didn’t seem to me that that
was a reasonable way of behaving … it wasn’t a
reasoned response to the scenario that we were putting
forward to them… They’d just made their minds up,
they’d looked at the recruitment figures and said
“Right, we’re closing this trial”… Although they
initially gave the impression that it was going
to be a constructive helpful discussion as to how
the trial could be salvaged, they had meanwhile made
the decision that they were going to close the trial
before we’d actually had the opportunity to put
forward our proposals for how things could be
saved’. [#50, Senior statistician]
In contrast, the funder representative called these
types of monitoring meetings ‘hub visits’ and an oppor-
tunity for ‘constructive dialogue’ after the trial teams had
given a presentation on the progress of their study:
‘I mean, we don’t just see the ones that are poorly
performing, although we often do call them in and
talk through if there are problems and what’s going
on. But it’s then an opportunity for us to sometimes
provide good advice to them about how they might
turn things round… and actually most people come
away from those feeling they’ve had a good meeting.
You know, clearly not everyone, but it’s not the sort
of thing where people come up and get a bit of a
kicking as it were… I mean, you do have the odd
difficult one where… you basically do have to give
people bad news that they’re clearly going nowhere
and it’s time to close the trial down’.
[#47, Funder representative]
However, there was anxiety and fear attached to
these meetings by researchers; shutting down a trial
might mean the loss of opportunity to answer the re-
search question, loss of employment due to shortened
contracts, loss of reputation for the CI and the CTU,
and a waste of trial oversight committee members’
time.
The CIs’ response to the perceived danger of the
funder stopping an insufficiently performing trial was to
try to present themselves and their trial in a positive
light, primarily to the TSC, which reported directly to
the funder. Some trial team members described how
CIs put a favourable ‘spin’ or ‘shiny surface’ (#20,
TMG member, RCT 4) on their progress reportswhen the trial oversight groups met, suggesting that
this was either human nature in face of a threat, or
the nature of academia:
‘Because ultimately the TSC is accountable to the
funder, and there is the big worry that they are the
people that could stop your trial … that they would
withdraw your funding. So I suppose people want to
keep them sweet… Make them think you are doing a
good job. Also because it is human nature, everybody
does it’. [#33, TM, RCT 7]
‘We want to look good; we want to look confident. I
think people in academia, people doing research, are
people who probably tend to be on the perfectionist
end of things. They want things to be nice; they want
things to go well. Yes, I think people want to feel like
they’re competent and in charge and on top of their
game, and can do it.’ [#20, TMG member, RCT 4]
Interviewer: ‘Mm-hmm, and so we – we don’t lie, do
we?’ ‘No, I don’t think we lie. I don’t think I have
ever sat here and lied, and I don’t think any of
us have ever sat here and lied, but I think we
put spin on things… there’s what actually has
happened, and then there will be the spin we
put on that to make it look like something
different happened. I think we do that all the
time.’ [#20, TMG member, RCT 4]
Independent members of TSCs also reported being
conscious they used ‘spin’ when conducting their own
trials. One such respondent suggested the trial team’s
role in a TSC meeting was to give confidence to the inde-
pendent members that the trial is under control. He pro-
posed that communication which is not totally open, but
‘managed’, is at times not just justifiable but preferred:
‘I’ve got a couple of CIs who like to go off in
tangential discussions about the study and how it
might be better, and you know opportunities missed.
I say to them, “Could you just not do that?” It’s not
the purpose, we are here to basically reassure the
independent [TSC members]. Now, on the one hand
I can see that, intellectually that might be not quite
right, that we are there to have an open
discussion… So I think the best kind of TSC is a
good, compromise between those two. That there is
a genuine sense of open debate and inquiry, but it’s
based on rock solid data, which has been produced
to a professional standard’.
[#37, Independent TSC member, RCT 7]
The use of spin was evident observationally in guarded
or incomplete reporting of information by trial teams to
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witnessed in TMG meetings (field notes, TMG and TSC
meetings for RCTs 3 and 4).
However, some respondents felt experienced TSC in-
dependent members would or should see through the
spin and ‘scratch the shiny surface’ (#20, TMG member,
RCT 4) to gain a realistic view of trial progress:
‘I guess the CI could try to do that, but I think if the
TSC has enough independent members and is doing
its job correctly, they would be willing to question and
wouldn’t be led inappropriately’.
[#49, Funder representative]
‘I would like to think that the old goats that serve on
these things are long enough in the tooth to see
through that rubbish.’ [#28, Statistician, RCT 6]
A CTU Director and a sponsor representative both
said the trial teams, but especially the CIs, were foolish
to present a shiny surface to their TSC by giving overly
optimistic verbal reports, as it prevented the TSC from
ensuring that the trial was well-run. Instead, they believed
that it was the responsibility of the trial team to communi-
cate in an open and honest way with their TSC:
‘You’ve got to take your dirty laundry to the TSC
and get it cleaned. That’s what they’re there for.
A lot of CIs don’t understand that the TSC is
there to protect them and to help them resolve
difficult issues. It’s fine when it’s all going
hunky-dory, but a lot of CIs don’t understand, I
think, that the trial oversight is their protection’.
[#39, CTU Director, RCT 7]
‘What you need though is a very open culture to do
that, because it’s the responsibility of the trial team to
bring to the TSC those issues as they arise so you’ve
got to, you’ve got to have a system and a culture which
does that rather than hides things away.’
[#48, Sponsor representative]
These findings suggest some tension in the relation-
ship between the trial team and the TSC. The TSC is
perceived to be close to the funder and influential in
determining whether a funder will withdraw funding,
but the TSC is also perceived and described in the
MRC guidelines as a committee of experts who guide
trial conduct and help to ensure a successful trial.
Discussion
This study is novel in its detailed exploration of relation-
ships between stakeholders involved in trial oversight,and how these relationships impact the trial oversight
process. We found evidence of good collaboration
between CIs, TMs and CTUs, with clinicians and trialists
learning from, and supporting, each other. Fundamental
to this was openness and mutual respect. Between trial
oversight committees, both collaboration and conflict
were evident; conflict arose when there were differences
of opinion regarding the best course of action and lack
of clarity regarding lines of communication and respon-
sibility. Differing stakeholder priorities reflected their
perceptions of what was required from them profession-
ally and could cause tension and conflict; for example, if
a CI felt that others were undermining efforts to keep a
trial open. Recognising, and respecting the value of, dif-
fering priorities among those involved in running trials
is likely to be key to successful relationships between
oversight stakeholders.
While CIs were perceived as highly invested in the
trial succeeding (i.e. providing a reliable answer in a rea-
sonable timeframe), even when the trial was in crisis,
CTU staff were perceived as more objective and hence
able to see if a trial faced intractable problems. As
previous work has found, this independence was highly
valued by funders as a way of enhancing the rigour of
the trial [6]. In practice, this perceived objectivity de-
pends on the relationship between the trial team mem-
ber and the trial: a CTU-employed TM might also
become highly invested in a trial, and indeed their profes-
sional standing might depend on it being well-managed. It
is also unclear whether a CI’s personal investment in a
trial is always problematic; ultimately, whether being
highly invested in a trial is associated with poor trial meth-
odology or conduct is an empirical question. In the con-
text of trial oversight by multiple parties, the passion of
one party (e.g. the CI) might be beneficial, with independ-
ent TSC members and the DMC playing a moderating
role to ensure that good scientific conduct is maintained
and participants’ wellbeing prioritised. However, a ceased
trial in effect may be considered avoidable waste [19], and
all efforts should be made to report and learn from the
reasons that the trial ‘failed’, i.e. produced an unreliable re-
sult, or exceeded timeframe and/or budget. To ensure in-
tegrity in research [20], it is vital that lessons from such
trials are incorporated into the future planning of trials
and reflected in developments in trial oversight.
The role of the TM in acting as a primary point of
contact and route for communication was important in
ensuring the smooth running of a trial and coordinating
the activities of trial oversight groups. This contrasts
with the MRC guidelines [1], which currently list these
roles as the PI’s; the MRC terminology should be up-
dated to reflect current practise and the European Union
Clinical Trials Regulation [21]. We found that clear
communication channels between oversight groups were
Table 5 Recommendations regarding trial oversight
1. Led by their Chairs, trial oversight committees must foster a culture
of openness and mutual respect, recognising and drawing upon the
skills of all trial oversight committee members. To ensure optimal
decision-making and problem-solving, committee conduct should be
respectful of all voices and Chairs should actively seek opinions from
all members
2. Recognise the partnership role of CTUs and TMs in managing a
trial and supporting the CI in decision-making, management and
achieving deliverables
3. The differing priorities of trial stakeholders in overseeing and
delivering the trial should be explicitly stated, considered and, where
necessary, realigned to the shared priority across stakeholder groups
to produce a good-quality trial that informs practice. Guidance and
best practice on resolving differences should be shared and could be
collated and hosted by CTUs and funders
4. Clear lines of communication between oversight groups should be
established in advance of the trial starting, documented in the trial
Charter, shared between stakeholders, and maintained. From the trial
outset, the frequency of oversight meetings should be considered
and agreed. The frequency should be regular enough to be
responsive to challenges and implement trial oversight decisions
promptly, while allowing for extraordinary meetings in the event of
challenges
5. Ensure a primary, single point of contact for the trial and
coordinate communication with trial oversight stakeholders
6. Consider and agree before trial initiation who will act as arbiter if/
when needed; the CTU may or may not play this role
7. Consult with stakeholders to determine the full implications of
funders appointing independent TSC members to trials, and agree an
approach to this issue
8. Clarify the roles and responsibilities of all those involved in trial
oversight, and make stakeholders aware of these. This includes the
different reasons for shutting down a trial, and which oversight
bodies might do so in which circumstances. Each trial should
consider these from the outset. Discuss before trial initiation the
information needs of different stakeholders and communicate
efficiently and in a timely manner as needed
9. Be aware of how the threat of monitoring meetings, or of closing
trials, can negatively impact trial conduct and relationships, especially
the way a CI or TMG might present the trial to the TSC. It might be
of benefit to identify risks to the trial from the outset, and report on
these at each meeting
10. Acknowledge how the close relationship between TSC and
funder and the threat of the latter withdrawing funding is in tension
with the role of the TSC in providing expert support to the TMG.
Power hierarchies between committees can restrict the effectiveness
of trial oversight, so efforts should be made to decentralise power
CI Chief Investigator, CTU Clinical Trials Unit, TMG Trial Management Group,
TSC Trial Steering Committee
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not to break down; if this did occur, the CTU acting as
arbiter could be helpful.
In this study, there was a lack of consensus regarding
who held power within trial oversight. One funder had
recently started selecting independent TSC members for
the trials they funded, and this was perceived as prob-
lematic by some as it shifted the TSC’s loyalty from the
trial to the funder. This chimes with the recent CTU
survey [1]; respondents reported decisions made by the
TSC have the potential to be overridden and expressed
disquiet about this. In this study, the funder was per-
ceived by some to be at the top of the power hierarchy
within trial oversight, with the CI at the bottom, due to
its role in financing the trial and potentially withdrawing
funding. However, who has ultimate responsibility for
shutting down a trial was contested, with sponsor,
funder and TSC representatives all asserting that they
could stop a trial. While this suggests lack of clarity
about roles within trial oversight, it also points to vari-
ation in practice and power distribution depending on
the funder. Our findings thus support the need for re-
search into the effects of different ways of designing,
conducting and overseeing evaluations of health and so-
cial care [22].
Perceived power and accountability affected relation-
ships between stakeholders in trial oversight, with CIs in
particular vulnerable to the threat of being called by a
funder to a ‘monitoring meeting’ when the trial was not
progressing well. A reaction to this threat was the CI
putting a positive angle on trial progress when presenting
to the TSC, which advises the funder. While this was seen
as a natural consequence of the CI’s position vis-à-vis the
funder, there were negative consequences identified for
the CI and the rigour of the trial in that the expertise of
the TSC would not be fully utilised. This highlighted a
tension between the two roles of the TSC: influencing the
funder and providing expert support to the CI and TMG.
Research in organisational psychology has shown that
communicating to a body perceived as having a higher
status often involves trying to project a favourable image,
and that this results in closed or incomplete communica-
tion [16]. In the context of trial oversight, guarded or in-
complete exchanges of information could potentially
damage the trust between oversight groups and re-
duce the effectiveness of trial oversight. This is the
very behaviour that trial oversight aims to avoid: open
and transparent communication from the outset could
identify difficulties promptly and allow the team to
find solutions to these challenges. A ceased trial can
also be an opportunity for learning, and should be
communicated as such. A shift in the communication
pattern is, therefore, needed. This is likely to involve
re-thinking the current power hierarchy in trialoversight, ensuring sufficient checks and balances to
decrease the centralisation of power, and changing
the behaviours and attitudes of both parties.
Findings from this study have clear implications for a
revision of the MRC guidelines for GCP. We offer the
evidence-based recommendations in Table 5 for future
consultation. The role of the CTU and TM in delivering
trials, and how they complement and support that of the
CI, should be included in the new guidance. We also
recommend that the terminology in the guidelines is
reviewed and updated to reflect current usage, especially
Daykin et al. Trials  (2017) 18:612 Page 15 of 16definitions of ‘CI’, ‘PI’ and ‘sponsor’. Agreeing on a com-
mon language would minimise the confusion identified
by Conroy et al. [1].
This study has strengths and limitations which should
be considered in interpreting the transferability of our
findings. We triangulated multiple ethnographic methods,
which allowed an in-depth exploration of trial oversight
practices in action from several perspectives. While the
DAMOCLES study [4] relied on recall of group decision-
making through interviews, our observation of oversight
meetings illustrated the ways in which relationships actu-
ally impact on the conduct and quality of trial oversight.
We used overt, rather than covert, participant observation,
which is subject to possible observer effects such as social
desirability bias. Unobserved trial oversight might, there-
fore, be subject to more tensions and difficulties than we
report. The trials in this study were academic-led and
publicly funded trials in the UK; it would be interesting to
explore trial oversight further within industry-coordinated
trial settings. The tripartite trial oversight structure involv-
ing independent TSC members commonly employed in
the UK is not widely used in other countries. We selected
only eight trials, all phase III RCTs, which cannot be rep-
resentative of all RCTs, although parallels exist between
trials. Furthermore, we selected trials experiencing
challenges to give added insight into the behavioural
patterns of trial oversight groups. However, an inter-
esting area for future research would be to compare
our findings with the trial oversight of trials which
are not undergoing such difficulties, as experiences
and opinions may differ.
Further research is needed to expand the evidence base
regarding trial oversight. In particular, the behaviour of
individuals within trial oversight groups (intragroup be-
haviours) has not yet been explored. In DAMOCLES,
intragroup factors, such as biased or overly directive
leadership and an expression of a limited range of opin-
ions during group discussion ‘groupthink’, were found to
impact the productivity of DMC trial oversight meetings
[4], but the presence of these behaviours in real-life TSCs
and TMGs has not yet been explored. The role of PPI in
trial oversight also needs further examination; our findings
regarding PPI will be reported separately.
Conclusions
Relationships between the stakeholders involved in trial
oversight are central to the process and quality of that
oversight. Findings from this study have important im-
plications for revising GCP guidelines and trial manage-
ment for RCTs internationally.
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